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Two Dutch travellers were infected with oseltamivir-
resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses with an 
H275Y neuraminidase substitution in early August 
2012. Both cases were probably infected during sepa-
rate holidays at the Catalonian coast (Spain). No epi-
demiological connection between the two cases was 
found, and neither of them was treated with oseltami-
vir before specimen collection. Genetic analysis of 
the neuraminidase gene revealed the presence of 
previously described permissive mutations that may 
increase the likelihood of such strains emerging and 
spreading widely.
Screening for antiviral resistance in influenza viruses 
has become important in recent years. Before the 
2007/08 season, resistance of influenza viruses to the 
neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors (NAIs) oseltamivir and 
zanamivir was only detected rarely, as the NA amino 
acid substitutions that conferred reduced susceptibil-
ity or resistance to these drugs had deleterious effects 
on the function of the neuraminidase and hence on the 
viruses ability to replicate and transmit [1-3]. However, 
increased use of antiviral drugs in certain regions of 
the world and stockpiling of antiviral drugs for use dur-
ing a pandemic, increased the need for systematic sur-
veillance of antiviral resistance [4]. 
In the Netherlands antiviral susceptibility of influenza 
viruses has been monitored since 2005 as part of the 
national influenza surveillance [5]. Likewise in Europe, 
many countries began conducting antiviral susceptibil-
ity monitoring in 2005/06 with the support from the 
two collaborating European Union (EU)-funded projects 
European Surveillance Network for Vigilance against 
Viral Resistance (VIRGIL) and European Influenza 
Surveillance Scheme (EISS) [4]. With this monitor-
ing system in place, the EISS network in Europe was 
able to rapidly detect and monitor the emergence and 
spread of oseltamivir-resistant former seasonal influ-
enza A(H1N1) viruses in the community [6-8]. 
The resistant viruses, which contained an H275Y sub-
stitution in the NA, were first detected in Norway and 
subsequently elsewhere in Europe in early 2008, and 
then spread globally within nine months [6-11]. In 
2009 the oseltamivir-sensitive pandemic A(H1N1) virus 
A(H1N1)pdm09 replaced the oseltamivir-resistant sea-
sonal A(H1N1) strain, returning the situation to that 
seen before 2007/08, where the vast majority of cir-
culating viruses were sensitive to both oseltamivir and 
zanamivir. 
In the Netherlands, only 20 NA H275Y cases infected 
with oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus were detected during the 2009/10 pandemic, 
matching the low proportions of such viruses detected 
world-wide [12,13]. Most of these cases involved 
immunocompromised patients undergoing prolonged 
oseltamivir treatment, with no further transmission, 
reflecting the poor fitness of the resistant viruses. 
Continued year-round influenza surveillance in the 
Netherlands since 2010 had not identified any more 
oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses until now. 
However, elsewhere in the world there have been 
reports that oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 
viruses with an H275Y NA substitution are being 
detected at a higher rate in community patients who 
are not being treated with oseltamivir, suggesting that 
the resistant virus may have become more transmissi-
ble [14-16]. The largest cluster of cases reported to date 
occurred in Australia in 2011, and involved the detec-
tion of an oseltamivir-resistant strain in over thirty 
community patients, most of whom lived within 50 km 
of each other, but also included a case as far as 4,000 
km away [15]. It was hypothesised that other muta-
tions in the NA genes of these viruses that potentially 
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facilitate accommodation of the H275Y substitution had 
enabled the virus to retain fitness when the H275Y sub-
stitution was obtained [15].
Methods
In the Netherlands, year-round surveillance for influ-
enza antiviral resistance is based on respiratory speci-
mens collected by the Dutch Sentinel General Practice 
Network of the NIVEL Netherlands Institute for Health 
Services Research from patients presenting with 
influenza-like illness (ILI) or another acute respira-
tory infection (ARI), and on influenza virus isolates or 
influenza virus positive clinical specimens sent to the 
Dutch National Influenza Centre on a voluntary basis 
by all diagnostic laboratories in the Netherlands [17]. 
Sequencing or single nucleotide polymorphism RT-PCR 
is conducted directly on clinical specimens or viral iso-
lates to monitor antiviral resistance or reduced sus-
ceptibility markers [5,17,18]. Viral isolates are further 
characterised phenotypically by NA inhibition assay 
and determination of the antiviral drug concentration 
needed to inhibit the NA enzyme activity by 50% (IC50) 
[5].
Since the 2009 pandemic, the Netherlands has been 
using a systematic approach for antiviral resistance 
surveillance based on a protocol and accompanying 
standardised questionnaire, which are available to pro-
fessionals through the website of the Dutch National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment  (RIVM) 
[12]. Municipal Health Services are engaged in this epi-
demiological investigation to track patient travel his-
tory, course of disease, exposure to antiviral drugs, 
possible source of infection and possible contacts. 
When contacts show respiratory symptoms, speci-
mens are collected for influenza virus detection and 
characterisation.
For comparison with the Dutch influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
sequences from 663 viruses collected since the 2009 
pandemic, NA and haemagglutinin (HA) sequences of 
150 viruses were downloaded from the EpiFlu database 
of the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data 
(GISAID) (Table 1). Phylogenetic, nucleotide mutation, 
and amino acid substitution analyses were performed 
using BioNumerics software version 6.6.4 (Applied 
Maths, Sint-Martens-Latem, Belgium).
Results
Through the sentinel general practice surveillance net-
work, a teenage patient (Case 1) was diagnosed with an 
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection from a speci-
men collected on 14 August 2012. Around the same 
time a hospital laboratory submitted an influenza A 
virus-positive clinical specimen collected on 17 August 
from a patient in their early 20s (Case 2) for subtyp-
ing, that was subsequently shown to be influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. Their places of residence in the 
Netherlands were about 100 km apart. The travel his-
tory of both cases mentioned Spain as a recent holiday 
destination. Sequencing of the NA gene of the viruses 
directly from the clinical specimens showed a mutation 
encoding the H275Y substitution previously associated 
with oseltamivir resistance. The patients were inter-
viewed by municipal health service workers and the 
viruses were further characterised. 
Case 1 had developed ILI (high fever, cough and 
malaise) on the day of return and Case 2 one day after 
return from holiday in Catalonia, Spain, with dates of 
onset only one day apart: 13 August 2012 for Case 1 
and 14 August 2012 for Case 2. Both cases experienced 
onset of mild symptoms (sore throat and cough) during 
their stay in Catalonia. The cases had no underlying 
disease and neither of them, nor their close contacts, 
had been exposed to oseltamivir through treatment 
before specimen collection.
Case 1 had stayed in Catalonia with their family between 
20 July and 13 August 2012, and was possibly infected 
by a sibling who developed mild symptoms (sore throat 
and cough) on 1 August. Later, also Case 1’s parent and 
a friend developed mild symptoms. Apart from Case 1, 
specimens were not taken from these individuals. Case 
2 stayed in Catalonia between 3 August and 13 August. 
Because of ILI with high fever this patient was hospi-
talised for observation between 16 and 17 August after 
returning to the Netherlands. 
Given a median incubation time for influenza of two 
days (range 1–7 days) [19], and taking the date of onset 
of mild symptoms into account, it is highly likely that 
both cases were infected in Catalonia. Their places 
of residence in Catalonia were approximately 200 km 
apart, and Case 2 did not visit any other places along 
the Catalonian coast during their stay. Apart from the 
two family members and friend for Case 1, neither 
patient could recall having met any other ill persons 
during their incubation period. Case 1 travelled back to 
the Netherlands with their family by car, whilst Case 2 
travelled back to the Netherlands by coach. Travel his-
tory did not reveal a mutual stop where the cases could 
have met each other.
Following discussion of our findings with Spanish 
colleagues, they reported no detections of influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in Spain, and specifically in 
Catalonia, since May 2012 (personal communica-
tion, Tomàs Pumarola Suñé, National Influenza Centre 
Barcelona, August 2012, and Francisco Pozo Sánchez, 
National Influenza Centre Madrid, August 2012).
Sequencing of viruses directly from the clinical speci-
mens of Case 1 (A/Bilthoven/4311200706/2012; GISAID 
accession number: EPI393738-41) and Case 2 (A/
Bilthoven/4361200003/2012) showed that they had 
identical nucleotide sequences for partial segments of 
the HA, NA, matrix (M) and PB2 genes. The viruses car-
ried an HA from genetic clade 6, while the NA genes 
contained mutations that encoded the H275Y substitu-
tion known to confer oseltamivir-resistance in labora-
tory and clinical situations (Figure). In addition, the 
Table
Submitting and originating laboratories of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses for which haemagglutinin and neuraminidase 
sequences were downloaded from the GISAID EpiFlu sequence database
A
Submitting Laboratory Originating Country Originating Laboratory Number
Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention Argentina Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Infecciosas 1
Australia WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza 1
Bangladesh Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) & Bangladesh National Influenza Centre (NIC) 2
Canada National Microbiology Laboratory, Health Canada 1
Ethiopia Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI) 1
Guatemala Laboratorio Nacional De Salud Guatemala 1
Mexico Laboratorio de Virus Respiratorio 8
Paraguay Central Laboratory of Public Health 5
Russian Federation Russian Academy of Medical Sciences 1
United States ADPH Bureau of Clinical Laboratories 1
California Department of Health Services 3
City of El Paso Dept of Public Health 2
Colorado Department of Health Lab 1
Corpus Christi-Nueces County Public Health 1
DC Public Health Lab 1
Delaware Public Health Lab 2
Florida Department of Health-Jacksonville 1
Georgia Public Health Laboratory 1
Kansas Department of Health and Environment 1
Kentucky Division of Laboratory Services 1
Maine Health and Environmental Testing Laboratory 1
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2
Michigan Department of Community Health 1
Missouri Department. of Health & Senior Services 2
Nebraska Public Health Lab 1
New Hampshire Public Health Laboratories 1
New Jersey Department of Health & Senior Services 1
New Mexico Department of Health 1
New York State Department of Health 1
North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health 3
North Dakota Department of Health 2
Oklahoma State Department of Health 1
Oregon Public Health Laboratory 1
Puerto Rico Department of Health 2
Rhode Island Department of Health 1
San Antonio Metropolitan Health 2
Southern Nevada Public Health Lab 1
Spokane Regional Health District 1
State of Idaho Bureau of Laboratories 2
Tarrant County Public Health 1
Tennessee Department of Health Laboratory-Nashville 1
Texas Childrens Hospital 1
Texas Department of State Health Services-Laboratory Services 1
Utah Public Health Laboratory 4
Vermont Department of Health Laboratory 2
Washington State Public Health Laboratory 2
West Virginia Office of Laboratory Services 1
Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene 3
(blank) 2
GISAID: Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data; WHO: World Health Organization.
viruses also contained NA substitutions V241I, N369K 
and N386S, the latter causing the loss of a potential gly-
cosylation site [20]. These three mutations potentially 
facilitate accommodation of the H275Y substitution 
as suggested for the Australian oseltamivir-resistant 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses detected in a cluster of com-
munity cases in 2011 (Figure) [15]. Virus isolation from 
the clinical specimens of both cases is currently in pro-
gress to allow phenotypic characterisation of antiviral 
susceptibility.
To put these two cases into an international context, 
partial HA and NA gene sequences of influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 viruses detected in the Netherlands spanning 
Table
Submitting and originating laboratories of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses for which haemagglutinin and neuraminidase 
sequences were downloaded from the GISAID EpiFlu sequence database
B
Submitting Laboratory Originating Country Originating Laboratory Number
Institut Pasteur France Institut Pasteur 2
National Institute for Medical Research Argentina Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Infecciosas 2
Czech Republic National Institute of Public Health 1
Estonia Health Protection Inspectorate 1
France CRR virus Influenza region Sud 1
Ghana University of Ghana 1
Greece Institut Pasteur Hellenique 1
Hong Kong (SAR) Government Virus Unit 6
Latvia State Agency, Infectology Center of Latvia 1
Norway WHO National Influenza Centre 1
Russian 
Federation Russian Academy of Medical Sciences 1
WHO National Influenza Centre 2
Slovenia Laboratory for Virology, National Institute of Public Health 1
South Africa National Institute for Communicable Disease 2
Sandringham, National Institute for Communicable D 1
Sweden Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control 3
National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID) Japan Sapporo City Institute of Public Health 1
Other Database Import Denmark (blank) 1
Mexico (blank) 2
Singapore (blank) 1
Public Health Laboratory Services Branch, 
Centre for Health Protection Hong Kong (SAR)
Public Health Laboratory Services Branch, Centre for Health 
Protection 2
Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease 
Control Sweden Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control 2
(blank) 5
WHO Chinese National Influenza Center China WHO Chinese National Influenza Center 1
(blank) 1
WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and 
Research on Influenza Australia Austin Health 1
Canberra Hospital 1
Childrens Hospital Westmead 1
John Hunter Hospital, Virology Unit, Clinical Microbiology 8
Monash Medical Centre 1
Pathwest QE II Medical Centre 7
Queensland Health Scientific Services 3
Royal Hobart Hospital 1
Westmead Hospital 2
New Zealand Canterbury Health Services 1
Total 150
GISAID: Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data; WHO: World Health Organization.
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the entire A(H1N1)pdm09 period (30 April 2012 to 17 
August 2012), were compared with those available in 
the GISAID sequence database, focusing on sequences 
from viruses collected in 2012 and those from the 2011 
community cluster of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)
pdm09 in Australia. This analysis revealed a very high 
genetic similarity of HA and NA sequences from Cases 
1 and 2 with A/Perth/33/2012, another oseltamivir-
resistant virus from 2012 that contained the H275Y NA 
substitution. The sequences of the Dutch and Perth 
viruses differed by only one synonymous and one non-
synonymous nucleotide change in the HA gene, and 
one synonymous nucleotide change in the NA gene. 
Influenza A/Perth/33/2012 was collected in March 
2012 from a 15 month-old infant who had returned from 
a holiday in Bali, Indonesia. Neither the infant, nor its 
family, was treated with oseltamivir before specimen 
collection.
Discussion
Although the Dutch and Perth viruses from 2012 carry 
NA substitutions, V241I, N369K and N386S, that poten-
tially facilitate accommodation of the H275Y substitu-
tion, as did the 2011 Australian oseltamivir-resistant 
cluster of viruses, the HA genes from these two groups 
form separate genetic clusters (Figure). While viruses 
similar to those detected in Australia in 2011 (HA clade 
7, and NA carrying V241I, N369K and N386S substitu-
tions) [15] have not been circulating recently, viruses 
like the Dutch and Perth strains with an HA in genetic 
clade 6 and NA carrying V241I, N369K and N386S 
substitutions represented a substantial proportion of 
Figure 
Maximum parsimony network of partial haemagglutinin (HA) sequences of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, the 
Netherlands, 30 April 2009–17 August 2012  (n=663) and 150 HA sequences from other countries 
GISAID: Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data; HA: haemagglutinin; NA: neuraminidase.
Dutch sequences spanning the entire A(H1N1)pdm09 period are combined with a selection of 150 sequences from the GISAID EpiFlu sequence 
database with a focus on 2012 (2009 n=3; 2010 n=12; 2011; n=40; 2012 n=90), and five from the community cluster of oseltamivir-resistant 
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in 2011 in Australia [15]. Superimposed on the HA network by colour are the NA substitutions V241I, N369K 
and N386S that potentially facilitate accommodation of the H275Y substitution [15].
No NA in databae
None of the three substitutions
V241l and N369K
V241l, N369K, N386S
Colours = presence of substitutions 
V241l, N369K and N386S in NA that 






2011 oseltamivir-resistant Australian cluster H275Y
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influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses detected around the 
world in 2012 (Figure).
To date, the majority of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)
pdm09 viruses have been detected in patients under-
going oseltamvir treatment [13]. However, the cluster 
of resistant viruses detected in Australia in 2011 and 
sporadic cases reported from other continents show a 
recent increase in the proportion of cases of oseltami-
vir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses from patients 
with no exposure to oseltamivir [14-16,21]. Further, 
the great majority of these cases were detected dur-
ing periods of high influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 activity, 
whereas the viruses reported here were detected out 
of season and may suggest low-level circulation of an 
oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 strain. 
In the 2007/08 influenza season, former seasonal 
influenza A(H1N1) viruses with the same H275Y NA 
substitution emerged in Europe and ultimately spread 
around the world, leaving zanamivir as the main alter-
native for treatment of seasonal A(H1N1) influenza 
virus infections [6-11]. It is thought that the emergence 
of this H275Y oseltamivir-resistant seasonal A(H1N1) 
virus was made possible by permissive substitutions 
in the NA other than the three described for influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, which offset the otherwise del-
eterious effect of the H275Y substitution [20,22,23]. 
If the NA substitutions V241I, N369K and N386S do 
enable the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus to accommodate the 
H275Y substitution without a loss of fitness, then the 
detection of the oseltamivir-resistant strains reported 
here warrants close monitoring of the emergence of 
oseltamivir resistance among influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
viruses in light of the emergence and rapid spread of 
natural oseltamivir-resistant former seasonal influenza 
A(H1N1) viruses in 2007/08. 
Rapid sharing of information on resistant viruses with 
regional centres for disease control and the World 
Health Organization is crucial to assess the threat 
posed by resistant viruses and ensure that treatment 
guidelines remain appropriate. Therefore laboratories 
that have the testing capacity, should conduct timely 
analysis of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses for the H275Y NA 
mutation and refer any resistant viruses to one of 
the World Health Organization Collaborating Centres 
for Reference and Research on Influenza for further 
characterisation. 
The surveillance results reported here illustrate the 
usefulness of sustained antiviral susceptibility moni-
toring systems that can deliver timely data to inform 
public health and clinical recommendations for antivi-
ral use.
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank the Dutch Sentinel General Practice 
Network for their ongoing year-round contribution to influ-
enza surveillance in the Netherlands, clinical microbiologist 
R. Brimicombe for submitting the clinical specimen of Case 
2, the technicians Shireen Jenny, Pieter Overduin and Ton 
Marzec for technical assistance in virus detection and se-
quencing, the municipal health service workers for their ef-
forts in gathering clinical and epidemiological information, 
the patients and their family members for their willingness 
to provide information in the context of event investiga-
tion, and Tomàs Pumarola Suñé, National Influenza Centre 
Barcelona and Francisco Pozo Sánchez, National Influenza 
Centre Madrid for providing latest information on influenza 
virus detections in Spain. 
The Melbourne WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference 
and Research on Influenza is supported by the Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing.
7www.eurosurveillance.org
References
1. Yen HL, Herlocher LM, Hoffmann E, Matrosovich MN, Monto AS, 
Webster RG, et al. Neuraminidase inhibitor-resistant influenza 
viruses may differ substantially in fitness and transmissibility. 
Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 2005;49(10):4075-84. 
2. Monto AS, McKimm-Breschkin JL, Macken C, Hampson AW, 
Hay A, Klimov A, et al. Detection of influenza viruses resistant 
to neuraminidase inhibitors global surveillance during the 
first 3 years of their use. Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 
2006;50(7):2395-402. 
3. Sheu TG, Deyde VM, Okomo-Adhiambo M, Garten RJ, Xu X, 
Bright RA, et al. Surveillance for neuraminidase inhibitor 
resistance among human influenza A and B viruses circulating 
worldwide from 2004 to 2008. Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 
2008;52(9):3284-92. 
4. Meijer A, Lackenby A, Hay A, Zambon M. Influenza antiviral 
susceptibility monitoring activities in relation to national 
antiviral stockpiles in Europe during the winter 2006/2007 
season. Euro Surveill. 2007;12 (4):pii=698. Available 
from: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.
aspx?ArticleId=698 
5. Jonges M, van der Lubben IM, Dijkstra F, Verhoef L, Koopmans 
M, Meijer A. Dynamics of antiviral-resistant influenza 
viruses in the Netherlands, 2005-2008. Antiviral Res. 
2009;83(3):290-7. 
6. Lackenby A, Hungnes O, Dudman SG, Meijer A, Paget 
WJ, Hay AJ, et al. Emergence of resistance to oseltamivir 
among influenza A(H1N1) viruses in Europe. Euro Surveill. 
2008;13(5):pii=8026. Available from: http://www.
eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=8026 
7. Hauge SH, Dudman S, Borgen K, Lackenby A, Hungnes O. 
Oseltamivir-resistant influenza viruses A (H1N1), Norway, 2007-
08. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009;15(2):155-62. 
8. Meijer A, Lackenby A, Hungnes O, Lina B, van-der-Werf 
S, Schweiger B, et al. Oseltamivir-resistant influenza 
virus A (H1N1), Europe, 2007-08 season. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2009;15(4):552-60. 
9. Dharan NJ, Gubareva LV, Meyer JJ, Okomo-Adhiambo M, 
McClinton RC, Marshall SA, et al. Oseltamivir-Resistance 
Working Group. Infections with oseltamivir-resistant 
influenza A(H1N1) virus in the United States. JAMA. 
2009;301(10):1034-41. 
10. García J, Sovero M, Torres AL, Gomez J, Douce R, Barrantes 
M, et al. Antiviral resistance in influenza viruses circulating 
in Central and South America based on the detection of 
established genetic markers. Influenza Other Respi Viruses. 
2009;3(2):69-74. 
11. Hurt AC, Ernest J, Deng YM, Iannello P, Besselaar TG, Birch C, 
et al. Emergence and spread of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 
influenza viruses in Oceania, South East Asia and South Africa. 
Antiviral Res. 2009;83(1):90-3. 
12. Meijer A, Jonges M, Abbink F, Ang W, van Beek J, Beersma M, 
et al.Oseltamivir-resistant pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 influenza 
viruses detected through enhanced surveillance in the 
Netherlands, 2009-2010. Antiviral Res. 2011;92(1):81-9. 
13. Hurt AC, Chotpitayasunondh T, Cox NJ, Daniels R, Fry AM, 
Gubareva LV, et al. WHO Consultation on Pandemic Influenza A 
(H1N1) 2009 Virus Resistance to Antivirals. Antiviral resistance 
during the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic: public health, 
laboratory, and clinical perspectives. Lancet Infect Dis. 
2012;12(3):240-8. 
14. Lackenby A, Moran Gilad J, Pebody R, Miah S, Calatayud 
L, Bolotin S, et al. Continued emergence and changing 
epidemiology of oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)2009 
virus, United Kingdom, winter 2010/11. Euro Surveill. 
2011;16(5);pii:=19784. Available from: http://www.
eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19784 
15. Hurt AC, Hardie K, Wilson NJ, Deng YM, Osbourn M, Leang 
SK, et al. Characteristics of a widespread community cluster 
of H275Y oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza in 
Australia. J Infect Dis. 2012;206(2):148-57. 
16. Storms AD, Gubareva LV, Su S, Wheeling JT, Okomo-Adhiambo 
M, Pan CY, et al. Oseltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus infections, United States, 2010-11. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2012;18(2):308-11. 
17. Dijkstra F, Jonges M, van Beek R, Donker GA, Schellevis FG, 
Koopmans M, et al. Influenza A(H1N1) Oseltamivir Resistant 
Viruses in the Netherlands During the Winter 2007/2008. Open 
Virol J. 2011;5:154-62. 
18. van der Vries E, Jonges M, Herfst S, Maaskant J, Van der 
Linden A, Guldemeester J, et al. Evaluation of a rapid molecular 
algorithm for detection of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 
virus and screening for a key oseltamivir resistance (H275Y) 
substitution in neuraminidase. J Clin Virol. 2010;47(1):34-7. 
19. Cao B, Li XW, Mao Y, Wang J, Lu HZ, Chen YS, et al. National 
Influenza A Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Clinical Investigation Group 
of China. Clinical features of the initial cases of 2009 pandemic 
influenza A (H1N1) virus infection in China. N Engl J Med. 
2009;361(26):2507-17. 
20. Fry AM, Gubareva LV. Understanding influenza virus resistance 
to antiviral agents; early warning signs for wider community 
circulation. J Infect Dis. 2012;206(2):145-7. 
21. Wang B, Taylor J, Ratnamohan M, McPhie K, Kesson A, Dixit 
R, et al. Frequency of oseltamivir resistance in Sydney, 
during the Newcastle outbreak of community transmitted 
oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, Australia, 
June to August 2011. Euro Surveill. 2012;17(27):pii=20210. 
Available from: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.
aspx?ArticleId=20210 
22. Chao DL, Bloom JD, Kochin BF, Antia R, Longini IM Jr. The 
global spread of drug-resistant influenza. J R Soc Interface. 
2012;9(69):648-56. 
23. Bloom JD, Gong LI, Baltimore D. Permissive secondary 
mutations enable the evolution of influenza oseltamivir 
resistance. Science. 2010;328(5983):1272-5.
